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Case No. 20100665-CA 
IN THE- ; -• 
UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
ANNA KING (f.k.a. Anna Wight), 
Petitioner/Appellee 
vs. 
JOHN WIGHT, 
Responden t/Appellent 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(c) 
(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering orders related to 
custody including that the parties use the services of ACAFS, that right of first 
refusal is limited to periods of three (3) hours or greater, and pick-up and drop-
off times for the Respondent's summer parent time? 
Standard of Revieiv. "In divorce proceedings . . . [appellate courts] give trial 
courts broad discretion." Carslen v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, fl 3 (Utah App. 
2007) (quoting Davis v. Davis.. 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court 
will only overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of 
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discretion. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court "will 
not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Overson, 971 
R2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Furthermore, in matters related to custody 
of a minor child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more 
advantaged position than an appellate court/7 Id. (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910 
P.2d 1209,1214 (Utah 1996)). The trial court's discretion "must be guided at all 
times by the best interests of tire child/' Id. -
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering orders on an 
equitable distribution of the parties7 property and debts? '•..:••. 
Standard of Review: Utah courts have held that "A trial court has ^ 
considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a divorce action, thus 
its actions enjoy a presumption of validity/7 Elnian v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176,180 
(Utah App. 2002) (quoting Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994)) (emphasis added). Appellate courts "disturb a trial court's property 
division and valuation only when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as a 
manifest a. clear abuse of discretion/' Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, 
the appellate court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
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, reasonability." Shinkoskeyv. Shinkcskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) 
(quoting Mast v. Overson, 971P.2d.928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered orders 
consistent with the stipulation, of the Petitioner and Respondent? 
Standard of Review. "In divorce proceedings . . . [appellate courts] give trial 
courts broad discretion." Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174,1 3 (Utah App. 
2007) (quoting Davis v, Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court 
will only overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
The statutes and rules pertinent to this appeal are Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
74, Utah Code § 30-3-2-9, Utah Code§ 30-3-3,. Utah Code § 30-3-5, and Utah Code 
§ 30-3-33. The text of these provisions is included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about August 9,2005, Petitioner filed her Complaint for Divorce 
seeking a divorce from the Respondent. Since the filing of her Complaint for 
Divorce, there have been multiple hearings in this matter resulting from the high 
conflict nature of the parties' divorce and the inability of the parties to come to 
agreements. On or about September 26, 2006, the parties stipulated to a 
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.bifurcation of the Decree of Divorce . The parties were divorced on October 23, 
2006. The parties have been actively litigated this matter since the entry of the 
bifurcated Decree of Divorce including multiple Orders to Show Cause wherein 
the court found Respondent significantly contributed to the high conflict nature 
of the parties' divorce and that he had repeatedly failed to follow the orders of 
•'the court:':"'';'''";-''.' 
For example/on or about May 10,2007, this matter came before the court 
on the first of many Orders to Show Cause initiated due to the Respondent's lack 
of compliance with the court's orders. 
On or about September 12, 2007, this matter, again, came before the court. 
At said hearing, the court ordered that the Respondent was not allowed to pick-
up the minor children at their daycare, Adventure Time, due to his inappropriate 
behavior at the minor children's daycare. 
On or about December 18, 2007, this matter came before the court on 
another Order to Show Cause. At said hearing, the court ordered that, due to 
difficulties at exchanges, that all exchanges were to occur at a neutral 
professional setting (ACAFS) and that no visitation exchanges were to occur at -
the children's daycare. The court also ordered that the Respondent at all times, 
was not permitted within one (1) block of the Petitioner's home. 
On or about March 10, 2008, this matter came before the court on another 
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Order to Show Cause initiated by the Petitioner. Petitioner had paid die one-
half (1/2) of the custody evaluation fees that the Respondent was ordered to pay 
to ensure a timely completion of the evaluation. Respondent stipulated that he . 
owed the Petitioner for his share of the custody evaluation fees. Issues of the 
Respondent's contempt for failure to timely cooperate with paying his portion of 
the custody evaluation and attorney fees were reserved. 
On or about June 26, 2008, this matter came before the court on another 
Order to Show Cause. At saici hearing, the court entered judgment against the 
Respondent for unpaid daycare and counseling fees incurred by the Petitioner. 
The court further found that the Petitioner met her prima facie burden regarding . 
contempt, but reserved sanctions for trial. 
On or about October 30, 2008, this matter, again, came before the court for 
yet another Order to Show Cause filed by the Petitioner and other motions before 
the court. At hearing, the parties entered into a partial stipulation, including a 
judgment against the Respondent, and new charges of contempt were reserved 
for trial. 
In addition to the above-mentioned hearings, this matter came before the 
court on numerous other matters including, but not limited to: 1) objections to 
the commissioner's recommendations; 2) motions to quash subpoenaed records; 
3) multiple pretrial hearings; and, 4) multiple review hearings. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On or about April 15, 2009, this matter came before the trial court for the 
first day of a multiple day trial During said trial, the parties entered into 
stipulations on multiple pending issues. The court also received evidence. Said 
trial concluded on July 16, 2009 after six (6) days of trial. The trial court ruled 
from the bench on the remaining reserved issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In approximately August 2005, the parties separated and the Petitioner 
filed her complaint for divorce. Petitioner moved from the marital home with 
the minor children and has had primary physical custody of the minor children 
since said separation. Respondent at all times has been the non-custodial parent 
Rather than remain in the marital home, Respondent made the unwise 
unilateral decision to rent the marital home to a third party and move to a home 
closer to the Petitioner. From separation through the sale of the home,. 
Respondent solely received the tax benefits of the mortgage payments. 
Respondent failed to maintain mortgage payments and the Petitioner was 
required to make payments to save the home and protect her credit. Despite 
alleging at trial that he was unable to make the mortgage payments, Respondent 
never moved the court for relief of the order that the Respondent pay the 
mortgage payments. 
The parties stipulated to sell the marital home. However, Respondent did 
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not cooperate with the sale of the home. Two (2) separate realtors, Mr. Brandon. 
Weekes and Ms. joy Lee, testified that the Respondent was not motivated to sell 
the home. Mr. Weekes and Ms. Lee also testified that the home was. not properly 
maintained while the Respondent hadpossession of the home. 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered orders regarding the 
equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate, including the marital home. 
After the parties' separation, they experienced high conflict in making 
even simpledecisions regarding the minor children. The trial court received 
substantial testimony and evidence regarding the high conflict nature of the 
parties' divorce. The trial court received testimony from Kaydeen Jensen, 
Administrative Director of ACAFS, regarding the difficulties that the parties had 
in communicating and coming to agreements. Ms. Jensen testified that the 
parties' divorce was high conflict, providing multiple examples. The trial court 
received testimony from the custody evaluator, Dr. Jay Jensen, who also testified, 
that the parties7 divorce was highly conflictual. Further, Commissioner Patton 
found in prior hearings before the court that the parties' divorce is high conflict. 
Said hearings with Commissioner Patton were also part of the trialcourt's record 
when it entered its findings. The trial court received testimony regarding a 
protective order entered against the Respondent The trial court received 
emotional testimony from the Petitioner about trie Respondent refusing to leave 
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her home and her feeling trapped by the Respondent in her home. The Petitioner 
testified regarding the parties' divorce "high conflict" nature of the parties' 
divorce.1 :: • ' : • • 
Due to the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce, the trial court 
entered orders, including the use of ACAFS, limitation of the right of first refusal 
to a reasonable three (3) hours, and other custody orders to help minimize the 
conflict between the parties. v 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings in this 
because: 1) Respondent did not marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
he changes; and 2) even if he had marshaled the evidence supporting the Court's 
findings, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
f i nd ings . •.•'•./, 
Point II: This Court should uphold the trial court's rulings on custody 
matters involving the minor child as the trial court did not abuse its broad 
discretion in entering orders on custody related matters. 
Point III: This Court should uphold the trial court's rulings on financial 
1
 It aupears that the onlv person that is challenging the label that the parties1' 
divorce is "high conflict" is the Respondent. Respondent's continual assertions 
that the parties' divorce is not high conflict demonstrates his lack of insight and 
further demonstrates why the use of third'party services, such as ACAFS, is 
necessary and why the trial court's order was reasonable given the tacts 
presented., 
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matters as the Respondent has not overcome the presumption that said orders 
are valid and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making said orders. 
Point IV: This Court should uphold the trial court's orders that were 
based on the stipulation of the parties as equity is not available to reinstate rights 
voluntarily contracted away. 
Point V: This Court should uphold the trial court's order awarding 
attorney fees and costs to the Petitioner as the ruling is consistent with Utah law. 
Point VI: This Court should award the Petitioner attorney fees as she was 
awarded attorney fees and costs at the trial court leveh
 ; . 
ARGUMENT 
L THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURTS FACTUAL FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF ITS ORDER. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings in this case for 
two reasons. First, because Respondent did not marshal the evidence in support 
of the findings'he changes. Second, because even if he had marshaled the 
evidence supporting the Court's findings, there is ample evidence in the record 
supporting the trial court's findings. 
A. This Court should reject Respondent's allegations of factual error 
because he did not marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings. 
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a '"party 
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challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding:." In order to prooerly challenge factual findings such as 
these, the challenging party is required to marshal "all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light 
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence/' Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Phis, 2007 UT 42/ ^  17,164 
P.3d 384 (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Conim%776P2d 
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Thus, to fully comply with the requirement, the 
challenging party must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 'findings against "an 
attack." State v, Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 11,999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). Perhaps the best explanation of the marshaling 
requirement came from the Utah Court of Appeals itself when it stated: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty 
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
. and fastidious order, every crap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw' must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's findings resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic hw. Co., 818 P.2d 
.: 1311,1315 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
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One key purpose of the marshaling requirement is to "remind [] litigants 
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial/' State 
v. Moore, 802 R2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Further, the marshaling 
requirement is designed to ensure that the court is able to meaningfully review 
the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the court below relied and overturn 
only those factual determinations that lack the support of substantial evidence. 
See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT at 1[ 17. As one commentator 
noted, the marshaling requirement, which forces an appellant to "catalogue the 
evidence supporting the trial court's decision/7 ensures that appellants do not 
merely "try to persuade the appellate court that their theory of the case was 
stronger than that which was advanced by the other side, or that their evidence 
and witnesses were more compelling/' Rather it ensures that "appellate review 
of a factual determination is strictly confined to an analysis of whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the particular factual conclusions that was actually 
reached below." Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement An 
Overview, Utah B. J. 22 (August/September 2004). 
Utah courts have imposed the marshaling requirements on pro se 
appellants. See Thomas v. Department of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 361 If 1 
(unreported) Addressing whether a pro se litigant must satisfy the marshaling 
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requirement, this Court opined that "while 'this court generally is lenient with 
pro se litigants/ such parties must still comply with our rules/' Blosch v. Blosch, 
2005 UT App 281 f 1 (unreported) (quoting Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 4); 
see also Maisbitt v. Fink, 1999 UT App 129 If 3 (unreported). 
Utah's appellate courts have historically accepted the lower court's 
findings when the appellant fails to comply with the marshaling requirement. 
See, e.g., State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, % 11, 92 P.3d 167. In Martinez v. Media-
Paymaster Pins, 2007 UT 42, if 116-21,164 P.2d 384, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that while automatic affirmation may not be required in all cases, it is still a 
permissible sanction for a party who fails to properly marshal the evidence. 
That sanction is appropriate here. This is not a case where an appellant 
largely complied with the marshaling requirement but then inadvertently 
omitted a few peripheral details. Rather, this is a case in which the party 
challenging the court's factual findings completely failed to marshal any 
evidence and instead merely provides the court with a restatement of his 
unsuccessful arguments from oral argument. 
Respondent attempts to address the issue of marshaling the evidence and 
improperly alleges that he is not required to marshal the evidence in this matter 
as the findings are legally inadequate. 
However, the trial court's findings and order provides the findings of fact 
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necessary to support it conclusions. For example, in making its order on the use 
of A CAPS, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 
"The use of ACAFS for pick-up and drop-off of the children has been 
beneficial to the parties/' 
"ACAFS has been successful in helping the parties communicate and 
limiting any potential emotional issues occurring between the parties at 
pick-up and drop-off/7 
"The emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling to 
justify the need for ACAFS." See Third Amended Findings and Order, 
Paragraph 6, Addendum. 
Additionally, prior to entering its orders on the marital home, the trial court 
entered the following findings of fact: 
"Respondent made an ill-advised decision when he left the home and 
decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as obtain another 
' residence for himself." Id. at Paragraph 25; 
- "Normally the expenses of the parties double after separation. In this case, 
the Respondent made a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the 
• parties." Id. at Paragraph 26; 
"Responded could have reduced expenses by staying iii the marital 
home." Id. at paragraph 27; 
• "Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately placing the 
marital home for sale." Id. at Paragraph 28. 
The above-mentioned examples are just a few of the instances of the trial court 
entering findings of fact in its order. See also generally, Third Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions Law, Addendum. Contrary to the Respondent's 
assertion, the court did provide findings of fact in its order and reversal is not 
appropriate on the basis of not providing findings of fact. Id. 
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B. Even if this Court addresses Respondent's sufficiency challenge on 
its merits, this Court should still hold that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's findings. 
Even if the Court determines that Respondent's brief meets the lower level 
of marshaling required for prose litigants, the Court should still affirm the trial 
court's findings of fact because sufficient evidence was not presented to 
overcome a challenge of clear error. A finding of fact is only "clearly erroneous" 
when it is "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence." State ex rel. E. R., 2001 Ut App 66,1 5,21 P.3d 680. 
Respondent challenges to the findings of fact in this matter can generally 
be grouped into three (3) separate categories: 1) challenges to the trial court's 
orders regarding the property disbursement and child related expenses of the 
parties; 2) challenges to the trial court's parent time orders including the use of 
ACAFS and right of first refusal; and, 3) challenges to orders that were the result 
of the stipulation of the parties. 
The trial court received substantial evidence at trial, and prior to trial, 
regarding the parties' financial circumstances and issues surrounding the 
disbursement of property, including the marital home. For example, the trial 
court received testimony from two (2) separate realtors that were involved in the 
sale of the marital home. The realtors testified as to the Respondent not 
returning calls and the poor condition of the home when they viewed it. The 
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trial court received further financial information from both parties. The above-
mentioned testimony and evidence is just some of the evidence that that the trial 
cou rt has on the record regarding the financial issues in this matter. As the 
record is patently replete with such evidence regarding financial issues, the 
findings are not so lacking in evidentiary detail as to be clearly erroneous. 
The trial court also received substantial evidence regarding the high 
conflict nature of the parties' divorce including, as discussed previously herein: 
1) testimony from Kaydeen Jensen, Administrative Director of ACAFS; 2) 
testimony from the custody evaluator; 3) previous findings from Commissioner 
Patton of the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce; and, 4) testimony from 
the Petitioner. Additionally, the trial court received testimony from Adventure 
Time Daycare of the substantial difficulties that the Respondent caused at the 
facility that led to him being excluded from coming to the daycare facility. 
While the Respondent challenges the findings of the court that the parties' 
divorce is high conflict/he has not demonstrated that it is clearly erroneous to 
label the parties divorce as "high conflict." The high conflict nature of the 
divorce was the reason the trial court entered its custody orders including, but 
not limited to, the use of ACAFS, the right of first refusal, and the pick-up and 
drop-off times. Based on the substantial evidence received at trial, it is not 
clearly erroneous to label the parties' divorce as "high conflict." 
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Finally, Respondent even challenges orders that were based on the 
stipulations of the parties. While there is substantial evidence to support an 
order appointing a special master or an order limiting the parties from making 
derogatory comments about the other party, it is not necessary to support said 
orders with findings. Said orders are the result of the stipulation of the parties. 
Contrary to the Respondent's assertion, there is sufficient evidence on the 
Record supporting the trial court's findings overcome a challenge of "clear 
error."
 : ,• / / •• : . ; , , ; , • ; , . 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
MAKING CUSTODY ORDERS IN THIS MATTER. 
"In divorce proceedings ..... [appellate courts] give trial courts broad 
discretion." Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, f 3 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting 
Davis v.Davis, 749 P.2d 647,648 (Utah 1988)). The appellate court will only 
overturn a trial court's final judgment if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. 
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court "will not reverse 
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability/' Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, ' 
19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Furthermore, in matters related to custody of a minor 
child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more advantaged 
position than an appellate court/' Id. (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 
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1214 (Utah 1996)). The trial court's discretion "must he guided at all times by 
the best interests of the child/' Id. 
The trial court's decisions regarding the use of ACAFS, the time limit on 
the right of first refusal, and pick-up and drop-off times in the summer are all 
orders related to the custody of the minor children and, thus, the trial court is in 
a more advantaged position than the appellate court. Furthermore, all decisions 
on custody related matters must be guided by the best interests of the minor 
children. \ 
A. The Trial Court Appropriately Ordered that the Use of ACAFS was 
Reasonable and Necessary due to the High Conflict Nature of the 
Parties Divorce. 
At trial in this matter, the court entered findings that "the parties have 
experienced high conflict that has seriously deterred their ability to 
communicate."' See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order, Paragraphs , 
Addendum. The court further found that "The use of ACAFS for pick-up and 
drop-off of the children has been beneficial to the parties. ACAFS has been 
successful in helping the parties communicate and limiting any potential 
emotional issues occurring between the parties at pick-up and drop-off. The 
emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling and justify the 
need for ACAFS." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order, Paragraph 6, 
Addendum. 
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There is substantial evidence in the record, to support the trial court's 
finding that the parties' divorce is '''high conflict" and the above-mentioned 
findings of fact. For example, as discussed previously herein: 1) Kaydeen Jensen 
testified as to the need for ACAFS; 2) the custody evaluator, Dr. Jensen, testified 
that the parties' divorce was high conflict; 3) the Petitioner testified that the 
parties' divorce was high conflict; 4) the daycare provider for the minor children 
testified as to the high conflict nature of the divorce and the difficulties caused by 
the Respondent; and, 5) the trial court had a long history of prior hearings both 
before the trial court judge and the domestic commissioner. 
Based on the high conflict nature of the parties' divorce, it was within the 
limits of reasonability for the trial court to order that the parties continue the use 
of ACAFS.2 ; 
Respondent argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it 
stopped his testimony regarding ACAFS. Prior to stopping the Respondent's 
testimony, the court received evidence from the Respondent that he felt that 
ACAFS was financially onerous to the parties. The court received testimony 
from the Respondent that exchanges were difficult due to the time it takes to use 
ACAFS including additional drive time. The court received testimony about 
2
 ACAFS provides services for the parties including calendaring, pick-ups and 
drop-offs, and other important services that limit the potential conflicts between 
the parties. 
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curbside exchanges and why the Respondent felt that the parties should use 
curbside exchanges. The above-mentioned arguments are the same arguments 
that the Respondent made in. his brief, wherein he erroneously asserts that the 
court abused discretion in ordering the parties continue to use ACAFS. 
Respondent has not established that the court did not consider his testimony. 
Furthermore, Respondent has not established that his testimony that it is outside 
the limits of reason to find that the parties should continue to use ACAFS. 
Even if this court accepts the Respondent's argument that ACAFS is a 
financial burden3, he must show that the order is not in the best interest of the 
minor children. As discussed previously herein, in matters related to custody of 
a minor child, the trial court's "proximity to the evidence places it in a more 
advantaged position than an appellate court." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 
1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209,1214 (Utah 
1996)). The trial court's discretion "must be guided at all times by the best 
interests of the child." hi. Respondent argues that the use of ACAFS creates an 
unreasonable financial burden. Respondent does not argue that the parties use 
of ACAFS is not in the best interests of the children. Respondent must show that 
3
 The trial court received testimony at trial of the parties' financial circumstances 
including the stipulation of the parties' related to many of the financial 
circumstances of the parties. Respondent has not demonstrated that this 
testimony was not considered. . 
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the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the use of ACAFS is in the 
children's best interest. Respondent has made no effort to argue that the use of 
ACAFS is not in the children's best interests. Respondent does not weigh the 
evidence presented by the Petitioner and demonstrate how that the order is not 
reasonable considering all the evidence presented. In fact, due to the high 
conflict nature.of the parties' divorce, it is reasonable for the trial court to find 
that the use of ACAFS is in the best interest of the minor child. 
B. The Trial Court's Restriction of Right of First Refusal is not an Abuse 
of the Trial Court's Discretion. 
At trial in this matter, the parties stipulated that each party is granted the 
right of first refusal to provide daycare for the minor child. However, the parties 
were unable to agree to the amount of time the children were to be left with 
another individual prior to a parent having said right and the issue was reserved 
for trial. At trial, Respondent indicated that it was reasonable for him to exercise 
his right of first refusal for time periods as little as one (1) hour. 
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 
that the right of first refusal only applies for periods of three (3) hours or greater. 
In support of his argument, the Respondent cites Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which 
provides that "Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing 
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the noncustodial parent it willing and able to transport the children, to provide 
the child care/7 Utah Code § 30-3-33(15). Respondent alleges that "the trial court 
completely disregards the principles in the statute governing the issue/ ' See Brief 
of Appellant, Page 41. 
Respondent is arguing that he should be allowed to have surrogate care 
for any time period with his minor children. If the Petitioner left the minor 
children with her husband for a period of twenty (20) minutes to run errands at 
the store/she would be required to contact the Respondent and give him the 
option to provide surrogate care. In fact, Petitioner would be required to provide 
notice to the Respondent any time that she was leaving the parties7 children with 
another individual. / • 
In this matter, the-trial court is in the best position to make orders 
regarding the period of surrogate care that is in the best interests of the children. 
Due to the high conflict in this case, it is not in the best interests of the child to 
transition the children for periods of twenty (20) minutes. It is not outside the 
limits of reasonability to limit the right of first refusal to three (3) hours. 
Additionally, even if this court accept the Respondent's argument in full 
that the trial court disregarded the principles of Utah Code § 30-3-33, it is within 
the trial court's discretion to disregard said principles. Utah Code § 30-3-33 are 
"advisory guidelines/7 Utah Code § 30-3-33 indicates that "the following 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
advisory guidelines are suggested, to govern all parent-time arrangements 
between parents/ ' Utah Code § 30-3-33 (emphasis added). 
. The trial court received substantial evidence at trial that would support the 
order that right of first refusal should not be more than three (3) hours. For 
example, the trial court received testimony of the high amount of shuffling that 
periods of one (1) hour would cause for the children. If the court were to accept 
the Respondent' arguments, the parties would be required to communicate 
whenever they run even simple errands to the store and leave the children with • 
another party. Due to the parties' high conflict divorce/ it is within the limits of 
reasonability to limit the exchanges of the minor children. Respondent has not 
demonstrated that, even in light of the evidence in the record, that surrogate care 
periods of less than three (3) hours are outside the limits of reasonability. 
The trial court is in the best position to determine if the advisory 
guidelines are in the best interest of the child. Even if the trial court completely 
ignored the advisory guidelines, it is well within its discretion to do so and not 
outside the limits of reasonability. 
C. The Trial Court's did not Abuse its Discretion in Entering Orders for 
Pick-up and Drop-off Times for Respondent's Summer Parent Time. 
The parties entered into a stipulation regarding custody and parent time, 
but reserved the issue of when pick-up and drop-off would occur during 
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summer parent time. At trial, the trial court entered custody orders for pick-up 
and drop-off for the Respondent's parent time in the summer. As the above-
mentioned orders relate to custody and parent time, the trial court's decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Shinkoskeyv. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 
(Utah App. 2001). 
It is within the limits of reasonability for the trial court to order 6:00 p.m. 
for pick-up and 9:00 a.m. for drop-off for the Respondent's summer parent time. 
Additionally, the trial court is in the best position to make determinations 
regarding custody and parent time. As discussed previously herein, there is 
substantial evidence in the record regarding the difficulties that the parties have 
experienced in this matter. In setting the pick-up and drop-off times for the 
summer, the trial court has provided consistent times that will not leave the 
children subject to the disputes of their parents on pick-up and drop-off times. 
As such, this Court should deny the Respondent's request to change the pick-up 
and drop-off times for his parent time. 
III. RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY ORDERS ARE VALID. 
Utah courts have held that the "trial court has considerable discretion 
concerning property [division] in a divorce action, thus its actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity/' Elm.au v. Eliium, 45 P.3d 176,180 (Utah App. 2002) 
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(quoting Schauniberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct. App, 1994)) 
(emphasis added). Appellate courts "disturb.a trial court's property division and 
valuation only when there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as a manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion/7 Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate 
court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." 
SMnkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. 
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). -
Respondent alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not 
give him credit for mortgage payments that he made on the home and when it 
gave the Petitioner $3,500.00 carpet allowance for depreciation of value in the 
maritalhome. 
A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by not providing the 
Respondent with Credits for Payment of the Mortgage Payment on 
the Marital Home. 
Respondent alleged that the trial court abused its discretion: 1) "because it 
considered only the economic situation of the parties at separation;" 2) the trial 
court "us[ed] the rationale that the last person holding the bag is responsible/ 
This is not an acceptable standard by which to make equitable marital 
distributions/' and, 3) "that the trial court's decision lacks completeness in 
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findings 01 fact and conclusions of law/' See Brief of Appellant Pages 49-50. 
Respondent has cited no case law or any sta tute to support any of his 
arguments that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not give him a 
credit for the mortgage payments made. Respondent is wholly unable to 
overcome the presumption of validity of the property distribution. 
In this matter, the trial court disallowed the Respondent's request for 
reimbursement for mortgage payments because of his "ill advised decision when 
he left the home and decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as 
obtain another residence for himself." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 25. The trial court found that "Respondent made 
a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the parties." Id. at Paragraph 26. The 
trial court found that "Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately 
placing the marital home for sale." Id. at Paragraph 27. In light of the evidence 
produced at trial, it does not"exceed the limits of reasonability" for the trial 
court to deny the Respondent's request for reimbursement for mortgage 
payments. 
Additionally, the court heard evidence at trial that the Respondent had 
previously stipulated to pay the mortgage payments. The court heard evidence 
at trial that the Respondent solely received the tax benefits of the mortgage 
payments. The court heard evidence at trial tha t the Respondent never moved 
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the court for relief of the order that the Respondent pay the mortgage payments. 
In support of the above-mentioned findings of fact, the record reflects evidence 
from two (2) separate realtors that the Respondent did not seem motivated to sell 
the home. The record also reflects testimony that the home was not properly 
maintained while the Respondent had possession of the home. In light of all the 
evidence submitted at trial, it is certainly within the limits of reasonability to 
disallow the Respondent's request for reimbursement for payment of the 
mortgage. 
Respondent alleges that the trial court"abused its discretion because it 
considered only the economic situation of the parties at separation." Respondent 
cites no case law that requires the trial court to consider the economic situation of 
the parties at the time of trial. The trial court heard evidence regarding the 
parties' financial circumstances, at the time of trial, and evaluated said evidence 
in making its ruling. 
Further, even if the trial court did not consider the parties' economic 
situation at the time of trial there is no requirement that the trial court consider 
this information. Furthermore, it does not exceed the limits of reasonability to 
not consider the financial circumstances of the parties at the time of trial. 
Respondent makes several arguments regarding "asset responsibility7' and 
that the trial court applied an unacceptable standard by which to make marital 
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distributions. However, none of these arguments are based in any precedent 
bearing Utah law. In actuality, they are not based in any law; only Respondent's 
prejudiced opinion of how the court should have divided property. Respondent 
has provided no law supporting his claims of said "unacceptable standard/' 
Finally, Respondent alleges that the trial court's decision lacks 
completeness in findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent does not 
provide any argument how the trial court's decision lacks completeness. As 
discussed previously herein, the trial court made several paragraphs of findings 
of facts in support of its decision. Id. at Paragraphs 23 - 28. Furthermore, as 
discussed previously herein, Respondent failed to marshal all the evidence 
submitted at trial in support of the trial court's findings and his argument of 
inadequate findings of fact should be denied. 
B. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Providing the 
Petitioner with an Offset for the Carpet Allowance for the Parties' 
Marital Home. 
Respondent misguidedly challenges the Court's order regarding the 
$3,500.00 carpet allowance for twro (2) reasons: 1) that the form of the Court order 
was not proper and that the trial court did not award her $3,500,00 for 
depreciation of the asset; and, 2) that the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding an allowance for the depreciation of the marital home. 
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1. :,: 1 he Trial Court has already Ruled thai the Intent of its Riding was to 
Grant Petitioner an Offset of '$3,500.00 for Hie Depreciation of the Asset. 
In his brief, Respondent argues that "Husband objected to the form of the 
order when this language [regarding the dissipation of the marital asset for the 
carpet] was originally submitted, but the objection was over-ruled/7 See Brief of 
Appellant, Page 50 (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that the trial court addressed the Respondent's objection 
to the form of the trial court's order. It is undisputed that the trial court 
.addressed his objection to the form of the order. It is undisputed that the trial 
court did not disturb the form of the order prepared. In response to the 
Respondent's objection to the language regarding the carpet allowance, the trial 
court"overrule[d] the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's 
findings and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench 
ruling/' See Ruling Re: Objections to the Findings of Fact and Order, Addendum. 
The trial court has already ruled that the intent of its order was to give the 
Petitioner a $3,500.00 offset for the carpet allowance. As such, this court should 
deny the Respondent's objection to the form of the order as the trial court already 
ruled that it intended to provide the Petitioner with a $3,500.00 offset for the 
carpet allowance. 
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2. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Providing the Petitioner a 
$3,500.00 Offset for the Dissipation of the Marital Asset. 
In making his arguments that the court abused its discretion, Respondent 
does not articulate any legal standard or cite any case law in support of his 
arguments- Furthermore, Respondent does not articulate how the trial court's 
decision "exceeds the limits of reasonability." Instead, Respondent argues that 
the court did not consider the current housing crisis in making its decision. Even 
if the court were to accept the Respondent's arguments in full, the award still is 
within the limits of reasonability and the Respondent has not overcome the 
presumption that the trial court's decision was valid. 
A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering that the 
Respondent is Responsible for Daycare and/or Kindergarten Costs 
for his Minor Children. 
Utah Code § 30-3-5 grants trial courts broad equitable powers in entering 
orders on property, debts, and other financial matters in a divorce action. Utah 
Code § 30-3-5. A trial court "may include in [an order] equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts, or obligations, and parties." Utah Code § 30-3-5. 
As discussed previously herein, orders regarding financial matters "will not 
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskey, 19 P.3d 1005,1009 (Utah App. 2001) (quoting Mast v. Qverson, 971 
P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
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The trial court granted the Petitioner $5,000.00 for a portion of the daycare 
costs for the minor children. In making its order, the trial court entered findings 
that 'The use of Adventure Time's services in this matter was helpful to reduce 
conflict between the parties and was a usual, beneficial, and appropriate form of 
daycare." See Third Amended Findings of Fact and Order on Hearing, 
Paragraph 10, Addendum. The trial court further found that "Respondent did 
not offer a practical alternative to Adventure Time. His proposed alternatives 
involved too much shuffling of the children/' Id. at Paragraph 11. Finally, the 
trial court found that "Respondent seemingly waived his complaint regarding 
Adventure Time by continuing to allow the children to attend Adventure Time/7 
In his brief, Respondent challenges the adequacy of the trial court's 
findings of fact on the issues surrounding daycare. In making said challenge to 
the findings of fact, Respondent does not marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's ruling. Respondent alleges that "the trial court does not include any 
explanation as to why daycare represents less 'shuffling of the children.'" See 
Brief of Appellant, Page 32. The trial court heard evidence and testimony as to 
the alternatives offered by the Respondent and found that his options were not 
reasonable. If Respondent wants to challenge the adequacy of this finding, it is 
his burden to marshal all the evidence at trial in support of the trial court's 
finding. Respondent fails to do so. Respondent makes other challenges to the 
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adequacy of the findings, but, again, fails to marshal the evidence in making his 
challenge to the findings. 
Rather than provide legal analysis as to why the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding the Petitioner $5,000.00 for daycare fees, Respondent 
opines on why the divorce is not "high conflict/7 his concerns over the fees in 
"high conflict" divorce cases, and his desire to provide surrogate care. As 
discussed previously herein, there is ample evidence in the record to support a 
finding that the parties7 divorce is high conflict. Furthermore, as discussed 
previously herein there is evidence to support a finding that Respondent's 
alternatives for providing surrogate care were not reasonable. 
Respondent's only attempted legal support provided is reference to the 
advisory guidelines of Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which provides that /'Parental 
care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care." Utah 
Code § 30-3-33(15). Said guidelines are advisory in nature and the court is not 
required to adopt said guidelines. Additionally, said guidelines do not indicate 
that if a parent is denied his right to surrogate care that the parties are not 
responsible for the costs of daycare. As such, Respondent has provided no legal 
support for his position that the trial court abused its discretion in awarded 
Petitioner daycare fees. 
Additionally, even if the court accepts the Respondent's argument that the 
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adequacy of the findings, but, again, fails to marshal the evidence in making his 
challenge to the findings. 
Rather than provide legal analysis as to why the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding the Petitioner $5,000.00 for daycare fees, Respondent 
opines on why the divorce is not "high conflict/7 his concerns over the fees in 
"high conflict" divorce cases, and his desire to provide surrogate care. As 
discussed previously herein, there is ample evidence in the record to support a 
finding that the parties' divorce is high conflict. Furthermore, as discussed 
previously herein there is evidence to support a finding that Respondent's 
alternatives for providing surrogate care were not reasonable. 
Respondent's only attempted legal support provided is reference to the 
advisory guidelines of Utah Code § 30-3-33(15) which provides that "Parental 
care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care." Utah 
Code § 30-3-33(15). Said guidelines are advisory in nature and the court is not 
required to adopt said guidelines. Additionally, said guidelines do not indicate 
that if a parent is denied his right to surrogate care that the parties are not 
responsible for the costs of daycare. As such, Respondent has provided no legal 
support for his position that the trial court abused its discretion in awarded 
Petitioner daycare fees. 
Additionally, even if the court accepts the Respondent's argument that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The Parties Stipulated to the Appointment of a Special Master and 
Equity is not Available to Relieve the Respondent of said 
Stipulation. 
On the final day of the hearing in this matter, the parties entered into an 
agreement, on the record, to appoint a special master for the purposes of 
resolving parent time disputes. The parties stipulated as follows: 
THE COURT: Am I hearing a stipulation to employ Mr. Jackman as a 
Special Master 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
MR. WILKINSON: For purposes of resolving any disputes between the 
parties on parent time issues. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: IT1 order that. (TT6 at 799-800). 
After trial in this matter, Petitioner's counsel prepared several drafts of a Special 
Master Order with the Respondent's counsel objecting to the form of many of 
those orders. However, the parties were able to agree on the form of a Special 
Master Order. Said Special Master order was approved as to form by the 
Respondent's counsel. See Special Master Order, Addendum. 
Respondent is now alleging that the "he has not stipulated to a special 
master to anything more than [choosing a therapist for the children], unless it is 
in consideration for using such services in lieu of ACAFS exchanges, and then 
only according to Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/'' See Brief of 
Appellant, Page 28, Footnote 11. 
Contrary to the Respondent's assertion, the trial record clearly 
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demonstrates that he entered into a stipulation for the appointment of Mr. 
Jackmari as Special Master for resolving parent time disputes between the 
parties. Additionally, contrary to the Respondent's assertion, his counsel 
approved as to form of the Special Master Order. 
In this matter, Respondent is now dissatisfied with the appointment of the 
Special Master and the form of the Special Master Order and is attempting to use 
his appeal as a means to relieve himself of burdens of the bargain he entered into 
while still retaining its benefits. Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992). 
Allowing the Respondent to be relieved of the stipulation to appoint a Special 
Master would be highly inequitable to the Petitioner. Id. 
B. Respondent's Stipulation to a Mutual Restraining Order is not a , 
Deprival of his First Amended Free Speech Rights. 
Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to the following: 
"The parties shall be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks 
regarding the other party to, or in the presence of, the minor children. The 
parties shall use their best efforts to prevent third parties from speaking in 
a disparaging manner about either parent in the presence of the child. The 
parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks 
about the other party to his or her fellow employees, employers and/ or 
ecclesiastical leaders/' See Third Amended Findings and Order on 
Hearing, Paragraph 50. 
Respondent now challenges the parties' stipulated order alleging that the 
order violates his First Amendment rigjits. The order of the court was the result 
i
—' 
of the stipulation of the parties. In this matter, Respondent has clearly come to 
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regret the bargain that he entered into. However, it would be inequitable to 
allow the Respondent to retain the benefits of the bargain and relieved of the 
obligations he assumed in his bargain. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992). 
Additionally, the First Amended provides that"Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech/' In this matter, congress has not made 
a law abridging the Respondent's speech. Respondent has entered into a 
stipulation that abridged his right to make derogatory comments regarding the 
Petitioner. As such, Respondent's argument that his stipulation has impacted 
his First Amendment rights must fail. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPROPRIATELY AWARDED ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS TO THE PETITIONER. 
In his brief, Respondent argues that "the trial court failed to adequately 
present its findings of fact and conclusions of law on this matter." See Brief of 
Appellant, Page 54. Respondent also argues that the "trial court erred in not 
considering the financial status and the likely financial results of the parties in 
awarding any attorney fees from the trial." Id. 
The trial court entered findings of fact as follows: 
"Respondent's actions and failures clearly resulted in Petitioner incurring 
substantial attorney fees. Respondent's actions and failures included the 
... following: 
A. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his child support obligation. 
B. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the insurance 
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premiums for the minor children. 
C. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the uncovered 
• medical expenses for the minor children. 
D. Repeatedly failing to timely pay the mortgage payments he was 
ordered to. maintain. 
E. Failing to timely pay for the custody evaluation fees. 
F. Interfering with the children's daycare at Adventure Time. See 
Third Amended Findings and Order on Hearing, Paragraph 34. 
The trial court articulated six (6) independent reasons for awarding the 
Petitioner's attorney fees and costs. At trial, the trial court received testimony 
and evidence regarding the Respondent's failures. In challenging the trial court's 
findings, Respondent has not marshaled the testimony and evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings. The testimony at trial supports the findings made by 
the trial court. 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) provides that "in any action to establish an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other 
party to prosecute or defend the action." Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) provides for 
attorney fees to "enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action." Utah 
Code § 30-3-3(1), As such, Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) does require the Court to make 
a finding that there is a need for the attorney fees and an ability to.pay attorney 
fees. In contrast Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) provides that: 
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"Ill any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award, 
costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may 
award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees/' 
Utah Code'§ 30-3-3(2). 
Utah courts have distinguished the two (2) sections of Utah Code § 30-3-3 
allowing for an award of attorney fees. Utah courts have indicated that "Utah 
Code Section § 30-3-3 creates two classes of attorney-fees — those incurred in 
establishing court orders and those incurred in enforcing court orders/' See Connell 
v. Connell, 2010 UT App. 139, Tf 28 (Ut. App. 2010). 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) does not require the Court to make a finding that the 
party has the ability to pay or that the fees are needed. Instead/Utah Code § 30-
3-3(2) provides that the Court has the discretion to consider ability to pay. Utah 
courts further clarified that "Fees awarded under subsection (1) must be based 
on the usual factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness. See Stoneliockerv. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App. 11, f^ 49. By contrast, in awarding fees under 
subsection (2), the court 'may disregard the financial need of the moving party/ 
Finlaysonv. Firilayson, 874 R2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)" Connell v. Cornel, 
2010 UT App. 139, f^ 28 (Utah App. 2010) (emphasis added). The court further 
clarified that "The subsections have different requirements because they have 
different purposes." hi. at fj 29. Utah courts have held that "In an action to 
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enforce the provision of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based 
solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party/ ' M. at«] 28 (quoting Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 R2d 1027,1030 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992)) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) "serve[s] no equalizing function but allow[s] the 
moving party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's 
recalcitrance/' Id. at ^ 30. In Connell, the Court remanded a request for attorney 
fees to the trial court to make findings whether attorney fees were awarded 
under subsection (1) or subsection (2). Id. at ^ 32. The appellate court gave clear 
direction to the trial court stating that 
"On remand, if the trial court in its discretion orders payment of 
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to subsection (1), its order should be 
supported by findings relating to Wife's need, Husband's ability to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the fees. If the trial court in its discretion orders 
payment of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to subsection (2), its order 
should be supported by a finding that Wife substantially prevailed on the 
motions for which she seeks attorney fees. Finally, if the trial court chooses 
to award no fees or limited fees under subsection (2), its order should be 
supported by a finding that Husband is impecunious or a statement on the 
record of its reason for its decision." Id. at'Tf 32 (emphasis added). 
Respondent also objects to the award of attorney fees on the basis that the 
court did not consider the financial status and "likely financial results" of the 
award of attorney fees. Respondent's argument fails for two (2) reasons. First, 
pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) the trial court is not required to make findings 
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regarding financial status of the parties in awarding attorney fees incurred for 
enforcement purposes. The court awarded the attorney fees for enforcement 
purposes and, thus, no finding of ability to pay or financial circumstances is 
necessary. Second, despite not needing to do so, the trial court made findings 
regarding the financial circumstances of the parties when it indicated that he 
Respondent had the ability to pay from the equity in the parties' home. As such, 
this Court should deny the Respondent's request to overturn the award of 
attorney fees to the Petitioner. 
VL PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), "a party seeking to 
recover attorney's fees on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth 
the legal basis for such an award." 
"In domestic cases, when a party has prevailed below and the trial court 
has awarded attorney fees, [the appellate court] will generally award the same 
party attorney fees when he or she prevails on appeal/' Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT 
App. 370,1} 18, 995 P.2d 14. In this matter, Petitioner was awarded attorney fees 
and costs by the trial court pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3(2). As discussed 
previously herein, Utah courts have indicated that "Utah Code Section § 30-3-3 
creates two classes of attorney-fees — those incurred in establishing court orders 
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and those incurred in enforcing court orders/' See Council v. Council, 2010 UT 
App. 139, % 28 (Ut. App. 2010). The trial court awarded the Petitioner attorney 
fees and costs incurred in enforcing the trial court's order. Similarly, Petitioner 
has been required to reply to the Respondent's brief to enforce the current orders 
of this trial court and, accordingly, Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees 
and costs on appeal if she prevails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's 
decisions and award the Petitioner her reasonable attorney fees and cost on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted Jun^s^Ol l . 
NATHAN S.SHILL 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Title/Chapter/Section: j j [Go To] Search Code bv Key Word 
Utah
 r / \ .;;• 
Code . 
Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter . -
T " ^ P r o p e r t y Rights 
Family expenses — Joint and several liability. 
y 
30-2-9. Family expenses - Joint and several liability. 
(1) The expenses of the family and the education of die children are chargeable upon the property 
of both husband and wife or of either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or 
separately. 
(2) In an action by a creditor against either husband or wife for the payment of a family expense, the 
creditor or debtor as the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable collection costs, 
interest, and attorney fees as provided in a contract between the cred itor and debtor. 
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Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter _ . 
~ Divorce 
2 
Section 
33 Advisory guidelines. 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the following 
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. 
(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed 
solution. 
(2) The parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's-
life. v.'" / . '• 
(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family 
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and 
other significant events in the life of the cliild or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently 
conflict with the parent-time schedule. 
(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the 
court when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent 
modification is made to the parent-time order. 
(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the 
cliild ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial 
home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is 
returned. 
(6) If the custodial parent will be .transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the 
appointed place at the time die noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to 
be picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable altemate arrangements for the 
custodial parent to pick up the child. 
(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parent-
time by either parent. 
(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the 
work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent 
but may not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35,5. 
(9) The court may make alterations fa the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the 
distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time, 
(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply 
with a court-ordered parent-time schedule. 
(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of 
-•*•'* '
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(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and 
daycare reports arid medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the 
event of a medical emergency. 
(13) Each parent shall provide the other with the parent's current address and telephone number, 
email address, and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change. 
(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored 
communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time 
if the equipment is reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the 
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time 
is reasonably available, taking into consideration: 
(a) the best interests of the child; 
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(c) any other factors the court considers material. 
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the 
court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to 
transport the children, to provide the child care. Child 'care "arrangements existing during the mamiage 
are preferred as are child care arrangements withnominalor no charge. v 
(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current 
address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders 
• otherwise. 
(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall 
have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, based on Sections 30-3-35 and 
30-3-35,5, the parents should consider if an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor 
children so that parent-time is uniform between school aged and nonschool aged children, is 
• appropriate. 
Amended by Chapter 297, 2011 General Session 
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Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter 
3 
Divorce 
Section Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony. 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or 
Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the com! may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the 
other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include 
provision for costs of the action. 
(2) Iii any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court; may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the 
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is inipecunious or enters in the record the 
reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, dining the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children 
inthe custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final older or judgment may be amended 
during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.. 
Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session 
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Chapter _ . 
; Divorce 
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Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of debts — 
Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time — Detennination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties'and children — 
Division of debts .—.Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and parent-time -
Detennination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in eveiy 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket 
expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, 
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondaiy in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 
which will take effect if at,any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or 
dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The com! may include, in an order detennining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court' determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for die dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health and dental care, and fer distribution of the 
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father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need fcr peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered 
under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by 
a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court- ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked hi a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; 
and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school 
duringthe marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in detennimng alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed 
at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
one of the spouses due to die collective efforts of both,' that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(t) In determining'alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
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alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce, 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address mzds of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unkss the court feds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action 
(iff) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court'finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number ofyears that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to tennination of alimony, the ••court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a fonner spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that fonner 
spouse. However, if the remaixiage is annulled and found to be void ab ratio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are 
determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse tenninates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the fonner spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
AmendedbyChapter285, 2010 General Session 
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78A" Judiciary and Judicial Administration 
Chapter Court of Appeals 
Section 
103 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction; 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its'judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. . . 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: V'-V';/:-. 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from fonnal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of infomial adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department ofNatural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge 
of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated 
or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a chaUenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
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C curt of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction, 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the reqiiii'ements of Title 63G, Cliapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings, 
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
^ f f i / f ° ^ Deputy \ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
1 ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
i v. ' . " ' • : " . •'• 
JOHN ANDREW WIGHT, 
Respondent. 
1 
SPECIAL MASTER ORDER 
Case No. 054401587 1 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Commissioner: Thomas Patton 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
•1. Frederick A. Jackman shall be appointed to provide intervention as a Special 
Master pursuant to Rule 53, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve disputes involving parent 
time issues. This appointment is based upon the stipulation of the parties and the expertise of 
Frederick A. Jackman. The Special Master Order pertains to the following children: Jane Wight 
(D.O.B. May 23,2002) and William Wight (D.O.B. July 12,2004). 
2. The parties shall comply with the decisions made by Frederick Jackman related to 
parent time issues. Pursuant to said appointment and the stipulation of the parties, Frederick 
Jackman may: 
Ron D. Wilkinson (5558) 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem, UT 84097 
Telephone: (801) 225-6040 
Facsimile: (801) 225-6041 
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A* Make decisions resolving conflicts between the parents relating to-the 
interpretation and application of the Court's parent timt orders which do not 
significantly affect the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental 
issues of custody and visitation. 
B. If the parties cannot agree on a therapist for treatment regarding the 
children's mental health, Mr, Jackman shall make this determination. 
3. - Frederick Jackman's decisions and determinations shall be appealable to the 
Court. 
4. Frederick Jackman shall not have authority to make any decisions which 
substantially alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of physical custody, 
alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with his/her 
children. No party contemplates a major re-configuration of the parties' time share arrangement 
Tliese decisions and others relating to the best interests of the children are reserved to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court and the State of Utah for adjudication.. 
5. Decisions of Frederick Jackman, by their very nature, are often made in 
circumstances involving severe time constraints, and possible emergencies; therefore, these 
decisions may be made orally, but in a fashion communicated directly to both parties. They are 
binding when made. In such an event, all such decisions shall be communicated to the parties by 
.a confirming letter as well. 
6. The parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with Mr. Jackman 
as to the terms and conditions of his employment, including compensation for Mr. Jackman's 
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services. Petitioner and Respondent shall be equally responsible fo: the cost of the Special 
Master. Mr. Jackman may suspend services based upon the failures of either party to maintain 
their financial obligations to Mr. Jackman. Notice of suspension of served shall be filed with the 
Court. 
DATED this M day ofMaf.: 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
2010. 
, \£}&.%g0. 
• r.fr-v^WWTO^i-. •„ >» 
J u d g e d Howard f M , ^ \ \ 
District Court Judge Bl l-p/:*' :&?& : \ 
vc 
NtWM^v. 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of (Jieh Conniy, State erf Utah 
- * / 2 / ° , ^ r ^Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOHN WIGHT, • ^ 
Respondent. 
_ . : L 
RULING RE: Objections to the Findings 
of Fact and Order 
Case No. 054401587 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on an objection to the proposed findings of fact and 
order filed by Respondent John Wight. Respondent filed his objection on September 28, 2009 
and Petitioner filed her opposition on October 9, 2009. Respondent filed a reply on October 19, 
2009 and the matter was submitted for decision on Januaiy 14, 2010. Neither party requested oral 
'argument. . " •. .'-••':•,-.;. 
Having reviewed the parties' briefs, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, the Court now makes the following Ruling: 
RULING 
The parties were before the Court for a six day bench trial which ended on July 16,2009, 
Petitioner submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Order on Hearing. Respondent objects to the 
1 
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proposed findings. The Court will address the objection to each paragraph separately. 
Paragraph 6 " '•;•;"';'' •••''>; .'".;•; .' 
Respondent objects to paragraph 6 because it includes findings which the Court did not 
specifically make from the bench. Petitioner asserts that the paragraph accurately reflects the . 
Court 's Ruling and that marshaling the evidence is proper. 
T h e Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court ' s findings 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling, but can support the • 
findings with facts admitted into evidence. 
Paragraph? 
Respondent objects to paragraph 7 because it fails to clarify that the parties are to use 
school to school exchanges except on holidays and it mischaracterizes the Order regarding future 
use of ACAFS. Petitioner asserts that the Findings in total properly characterizes the type of . 
exchanges that are to occur. Petitioner asserts that.school to school exchanges are to occur except 
when the children are not in school, which would include days other than holidays. Additionally, 
the terms regarding ACAFS is in accordance with the Ruling and should not be removed. 
However, Petitioner does r\o\ object to the inclusion of language which describes how the Court 
is optimistic that the parties use of ACAFS will not last long and that only a judge, not a 
commissioner, will be able to order the discontinaance of ACAFS. 
The Court finds that paragraph 7 is accurate and does not need to be changed in any 
o 
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substantive way. However, the Court did observe that it was hopeful that ACAFS would not be 
necessary for an extended period of time. Therefore, language should be added to the Findings 
and Order which reflect this sentiment of the Court.. 
Paragraph 10 
Respondent objects to paragraph 10 because it goes beyond the Court's bench ruling to 
include statements the Court did not make. Petitioner asserts that the paragraph is proper as a... 
finding of the Court. •
 v, 
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling. 
Paragraphs 11-12 
Respondent objects to paragraphs 11-12 because they use the teim "Adventure Time" and 
not daycare and because the'.term "effectively waived" is used instead of "seemingly waived." 
The Petitioner asserts that the Court was addressing Adventure Time and not simply daycare, 
which makes the paragraphs proper. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that there is little difference 
between "effectively" and "seemingly" and therefore, either term would be proper. 
Noting that Petitioner does not object to changing the language, the Court will use the 
term "seemingly" rather than "effectively** in the Findings and Order, 
x <ii a ^ i apjil !•? 
Respondent objects to paragraph 15 because it should simply refer back to the stipulation 
3 
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of the parties. Petitioner asserts that the language in needed because the Findings later include the 
terms of the stipulation which is proper 
• The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties does control the parent time issues . 
except as supplemented by the Court's Ruling. However, every stipulation needs to be reduced . 
from a stipulation to an Order of the Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the inclusion of 
paragraph 15 is consistent and -necessary. • • -• 4 
Paragraphs 16-21 
Respondent objects to paragraphs 16-21 because they make findings not included or 
contemplated by the Court's bench ruling. Petitioner argues that these paragraphs were 
contemplated by the Court and should be included as to limit the confusion regarding the '.-.;.;, 
exchanges; y '••"''•''- • •'•';: :\/;- . ^ ; \ ."••••'..;" 
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings .-, 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used inthe bench ruling. 
Paragraph 22 
Respondent objects to paragraph 22 because it uses "shall receive" instead of "is 
awarded." Petitioner does not object to the change of "is awarded" to "shall receive" because 
either term is appropriate. 
Noting that Petitioner does not object to changing the language, the Court order should 
include the term "is awarded*' rather than "shall receive." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paragraph 28 ' 
Respondent objects to paragraph 28 and argues that it should be removed completely : 
because it misstates the Court's findings. Petitioner argues that paragraph 28 reflects the Court's • 
Ruling. 
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings 
• and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling. The Court did find 
that the failure to sell the marital home did incur substantial costs for all parties which could have 
been reduced or eliminated had Respondent placed the home for sale instead of making a 
unilateral decision to move out and rent the marital home. 
Paragraph 30 
Respondent objects to paragraph 30 and argues that it should be removed completely 
because it misstates the Court's findings. Petitioner argues that paragraph 30 does reflect the 
Court's Ruling. : • ' • • •
 r ..:• V.- ; 
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling. 
Paragraph 32 
Respondent objects to paragraph 32 and argues that it should be removed completely 
because it misstates the Court's findings, Petitioner argues that paragraph 32 reflects the Court's 
Ruling. 
5 
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The Court overrules the objection as the finding is-consistent with the Court's findings 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling. 
Paragraphs 34-35 
Respondent objects to paragraphs 34-35 and argues that they should be removed 
completely because they misstatethe Court's findings. Petitioner asserts that these paragraphs are 
appropriate because they are the evidence that support the Ruling and were properly marshaled. • 
The Court overrules the objection as the finding is consistent with the Court's findings 
and Petitioner is not limited to the specific words used in the bench ruling 
Paragraphs 37-55 
Respondent objects to paragraphs 37-55 and argues that they should be removed 
completely because the stipulation of the parties entered on May 6 and May 20, 2009 should be 
the final document regarding those findings. Petitioner asserts that these paragraphs are important 
•for cheating ode document that is the governing Order regarding all issue 
Additionally, having one Order will limit confusion and the paragraphs do not substantively 
change anything stipulated to by the parties. 
The Court finds that the stipulation of the parties does control the parent time issues 
except as supplemented by the Court. However, every stipulation needs to be reduced from a 
stipulation to an Order of the Court. Therefore, the Court finds that the inclusion of paragraphs 
37-55 are consistent and necessary. The Court finds that these paragraphs accurately state the 
6 
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stipulation of the parties and may be entered as part of the Order of the Court. 
The Court overrules in part and grants in part Respondent's objections consistent with 
this Ruling. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to submit amended Findings and Order on Hearing 
consistent with this Ruling. 
DATED this ^AjTday of February, 2010. 
' . BYTHECOURT: 
m „ ... 
Hon/Fred D, Howard 
District Court Judge 
7 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify tot true copies of the foregoing Ming « « i » J M postage prepaid, on the 
2 M ^ , 201Cito tltefClowing at to addresses mdtca.rf: -
Steve S. Christensen 
Mathew B. Anderson 
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ron D. Wilkinson 
815 East 800 South #101 
Orem, UT 84097 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
t/z'fi* ** Deputy 
Ron D. Wilkinson (5558) 
The Heritage Building 
SI5 East 800 South 
Orcm,UT 84097 
1 elcphone; ($01) 223-604Q 
Facsimile: (801) 225-€04 J ' 
Attorney for Petitioner 
m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAI £ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT, THIRD AMENDED FINDINGS AND 
ORDER ON HEARING 
Petitioner/ 
v. Case No.: 054401587. ; 
I Judge: Howard 
JOHN WIGHT, • Commissioner: Patton 
Respondent. I 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, for trial. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Ron D. Wilkinson. The Respondent : 
was present and represented by counsel, Steve Christensen and Matt Anderson. The 
parties resolved certain issues by stipulation and the Court heard arguments at trial on the 
remaining issues. Having reviewed the file, hearing evidence and argument from the 
parties, and for good cause, the Court finds and orders as follows: 
PARENTING ISSUES 
I. There has clearly been a long and difficult history in tills matter. 
r> • " > 
2. T) roughout this time, the parties have experienced high conflict that h^5 
seriously deterred their ability to conmrjnicatc. 
3. The Court does not question that the parties each feci intensely the love 
for the children in this matter. 
4. The Court respects both parties desire to preserve ths love ihey have for 
the children. 
5. The Court is required, with tlie remaining issues, lo weigh the equitable 
issues to determine what is fair. The Court's ruling is made based on what is fair and 
equitable given the circumstances. 
ACAFS-THE FAMILY ACADEMY 
6. The use of ACAFS for pick-up and drop-off of the children- has bsen 
beneficial to the parties. ACAFS has been successfijl in helping tbc parties comrnimicaue 
and limiting any potential emotional issues occurring between the parties et pick-up and 
drop-off. The emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling and justify 
the need for ACAFS. 
7. The parties shall continue to use tlie services of ACAFS for both 
calendaring and for pick-up and drop-off. If either party requests ihat ACAFS is no 
longer necessary, only a judge may order that ACAFS is no longer nccccsary. Ike 
requesting party must show a change of circumstances has occurred thst no longer 
justifies the need for ACAFS. The Court is hopeful that ACAFS will not be necessary for 
an extended period of lime. 
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r* ^ 
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 
S. As provided later herein, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the 
parties are granted the ri shl of first refusal, under the 1 imits and conditions set forth 
herein. 
5. Said conditions include Umt, the parties will give the required notice and 
opportunity lor first right of refusal, pursuant to the stipulation gf Uto parties, if either 
party is leaving the minor children'in the care of a third party for at time period equal to 
CT greater than three (3) hours. 
CHILD CARE AND CHILD CARE EXPENSES 
10. The use of Adventure Time's services in this matter was helpful to reduce 
.conflict between die parties and was a usual, beneficial, and appropriate form of daycare. 
11. Respondent did not offer a practical alternative to Adventure Time. His 
proposed alternatives involved too much shuffling of the children. 
12. Further, Respondent seemingly waived Ids complaint regarding Adventure. 
Time by continuing to allow the children to attend Adventure Time. 
13. Petitioner is awarded $5,000.00 for a portion of the costs incurred for 
Adventure Tune to provide daycare for the parties minor children. 
14. Adventure Time can continue to be used for the children. 
PARENT TIME 
15. Parent time shall be as later provided herein pursuant to the parties* 
stipulated order. 
r <**\ 
16. Each party may pick-up or drop-off die duldrcu at school ftu his or her 
parent time consistent wiU\ Utah Code § 30-3-35 as described herein. 
17. Consistent witii Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
begins on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, his 
parent time shad begin at the end of the children's school day and lie shall pick up the 
children at school at die time the children arc dismissed. 
18. Consistent wiui Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent tunc 
ends on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, las 
parent time shall end at die beginning of the school day and he shall deliver the children 
to school at uhc time die children are scheduled to begin their school day. 
19. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent1 s parent time 
begins on days when the children are nut attending school and not scheduled to attend 
school, his parent dine, which shall be overnight, shall begin at 6;00 p.m. and he will pick 
up the children at ACAFS. 
20. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
ends on days when the children arc not attending school and not scheduled to attend 
school, his parent time shall end at 9:00 a.m. and he shall drop off the children at 
ACAFS. 
21. The parties' parent time for ail holidays shall begin and end consistent 
with the relevant time set forth in Utah Code § 30-3-35. 
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RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT 
22. The Court has considered the parties' claims for retroactively paying ' 
and/or adjusting the pa*tics' child support. In weighing all equities, Petitioner is awarded 
S4,632.00 for her claims for retroactive payments of child support. Respondent is 
awarded given a credit of $4,084.00 for his claims for retroactive adjustment of his child 
support obligation. With the aforementioned offsets, Petitioner is awarded a total amount 
from Respondent of S548.0 for unpaid child support. 
MARITALHOME 
23. The Court notes in tins matter that the decisions regarding the marital 
home require a substantial amount of equitable consideration. 
24. Courts generally do not criticize the manner by which people separate. 
The Court recognizes that it is usually beneficial to maintain two (2) residences after 
separation to avoid conflict, potential domestic violence, and other concerns. 
25. In the current case. Respondent made an ill-advised decision when he left 
the home and decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as obtain another 
residence for himself. 
26. Normally the expenses of the parties double after separation. In this case, 
tlie Respondent made a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the parties. 
27. Respondent could have reduced expenses by staying in the marital home. 
28. Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately placing the 
marital home for sale. 
r <-s 
29. Based on the foregoing, the Court will not give the Respondent credit for 
the payments that he made on the mortgage of the marital home and Respondent's 
request for a credit of approximately $13,000.00 reimbursement for payments he made or 
the mortgage is, hereby, denied. 
30. Regarding the claims of reduction of the marital assets pursuant to the 
carpet allowance and other related expenses, Petitioner shall receive $3,500.00 from 
Respondent's share of the equity in the marital home. 
31. There were miscellaneous expenses for the marital home paid by 
Respondent. The parties shall share the miscellaneous costs of $2,362.00, with 
Respondent receiving a credit from Petitioner for $1,18 i .00. 
32. The Petitioner made payments on the marital home in 2008. The 
payments that the Petitioner made for the mortgage in 2008 shall be shared equally, with 
Petitioner receiving a credit of $1,947.24. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
33. The Court has carefully considered the request for attorney fees of the 
parties in his matter, 
34. Respondent's actions and failures clearly resulted in Petitioner incurring 
substantial attorney fees. Respondent's actions and failures include the following: 
A. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his child support obligation. 
B. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the insuiaace 
premiums for the minor children. 
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C. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the 
uncovered medical expenses for the minor children. 
D. Repeatedly failing tc imeiy pay the mortgage payments he was 
ordered to maintain. 
E. Failing to timely pay for the custody evaluation ices. 
F. Interfering witluhc children's daycai-c at Adventure Time. 
35. Petitioner was required to bring multiple Orders to Show Cause because of 
said failures. 
3G. Petitioner is, therefore, awarded $4,000.00 in attorney fees in this .matter. 
The Com! finds that the above-mentioned fees were actually incurred, the fees arc 
reasonable and necessary, and the Respondent lias the ability to pay the attorney fees with 
the offsets zi\& home equity he is receiving in this matter. 
ORDER AND FINDINGS BASED ON STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
FURTHER ORDER AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
37. Custody: The parties shall have joint legal and joint physical custody of 
their minor children, Jane Wight and William Wight, as further described herein. For the 
purposes of parent-time, Petitioner is, hereby, designated as the "custodial parent" and 
Respondent is designated as the "noncustodial parent." 
33. Purpose and Intent of the Parties: The parties seek to maximize the tim& 
each parent has with the children and to facilitate meaningful parent-time for both 
parents. To that end, living in close proximity to each other was stated to be important to 
f* 
the parties because proximity allows both parents to maintain and foster strong 
relationships between the children and each parent. In choosing school and other 
locations where the children will participate in activities, the above-stated purpose shall 
guide both parents' decisions. 
39. Parent Time Schedule; Petiuoncr v/ill provide the primary residence for 
the Children, SUhjCCt tO Respondent spending time with the children according to the 
following parent-time schedule: 
A. When school is in session, Respondent shall have parent-time with 
die children every other weekend beginning on Friday after school and 
ending on the following Monday. The parties were unable to resolve the 
issue of when Respondent's parent time ends on Monday. This issue was 
resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
B. When school is in session, during the week(s) Respondent has 
weekend parent time with the children, Respondent shall have mid-week 
parent-lime with the children beginning on Tuesday after school and 
ending on Wednesday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of 
when Respondent's parent time ends on Wednesday. The issue was 
resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
C. When school is in session, during the week that the Respondent 
does not have weekend parent-time, Respondent shall have parent-time 
with the children on Thursday beginning after school and ending on 
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r* *~S 
Friday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of when 
Respondent's parent lime ends on Friday. The issue was resolved by 
decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
D. William shall attend half day kindergarten. 
E. All parent time not awarded to the Respondent shall be awarded tr> 
the Petitioner consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35 and the schedule set 
forth herein. 
F. The parties shall have extended parent time with the children 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. 
40. Holiday Parent Time: Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties 
shall have holiday parent-time with the children pursuant to Utah Cpde Annotated § 30-
3-55. 
A. Petitioner shall always have holiday parent time on President's 
Day, July 4 th, Memorial Day, and Spring Break. Petitioner will have 
Mother's Day from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 
p.m. on the holiday. 
B. Respondent shall always have parent time on Human Right's Day, 
July 24*\ Labor Day, and Fall Break. Respondent will have Father's Day 
from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the 
holiday. 
r* /-•S 
C. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35(2)(e)(b)r Respondent 
has elected for his parent-time over scheduled holiday weekends to begin 
from the time the children's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning 
of the holiday weekend until 7:00 p.m. on the last day of the holiday 
weekend. 
41. Right of First Refusal: Both parties, before leaving the children ••vii.h a 
third party, shall give the other parent the first opportunity to provide care fur liu; child. 
The parent requesting care shall email the other as soon as he/she is reasonable able after 
learning of the need for care for the children. If the notice of the need for care is less man 
24 hours from the time care is needed, notice will be given by a telephone call to the 
other parent's cellular telephone. The parent providing care shall pick up and return the 
children promptly. 
42. Daycare: 
A. If the need for surrogate care is ongoing and regular, such as 
during both parlies' routine work day, Petitioner will choose the day care, 
subject to the Respondent's right of first refusal. 
B. If a parent is not available to care for the children when sporadic 
daycare is required, the parent who has the children in his/her can; at the 
time will choose a daycare provider for the child. 
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Friday. The panics were unable to resolve the issue of when 
Respondent's parent time ends on Friday. The issue was resolved by 
decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
D. William shall attend half day kindergarten. 
E." . All parent time not awarded to the Respondent shall be awarded to-
the Petitioner consistent widi Utah Code § 30-3-35 and the schedule set 
forth herein. 
F. The parties shall have extended parent lime with the children 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. 
40. Holiday Parent Time: Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties 
shall have holiday parent-time with the children pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-
3-35. 
A. Petitioner shall always have holiday parent time on President's 
Day, July 4th, Memorial Day, and Spring Break. Petitioner will have 
Mother's Day from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 
p.m. on the holiday. 
B. Respondent shall always have parent time on Human Right's Day, 
July 24th, Labor Day, and Fall Break. Respondent will have Father's Day 
v 
from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 pjn . on the 
holiday. 
r /*S 
C. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ij 30-3-35(2)(cX"). K-spunwrn 
has elected for his parent-time over scheduled holiday weekends to begin 
from the time the children's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning 
of die holiday weekend until 7:00 p.m. on the last day of the holiday 
weekend. 
41. Right of Pirst Refusal: Both parties, before leaving the childrrn with ?, 
third party, shall give the other parent the first opportunity to provide care fu; ihs child. 
The parent requesting care shall email the other as soon as he/she is reasonable nblc after 
learning of the need for care for the children. If the notice of the need for care is less than 
24 hours from the time care is needed, notice will be given by a telephone call lo the 
other parent's cellular telephone. The parent providing care shall pick up and return the 
children promptly. 
42. Daycare: 
A. If the need for surrogate care is ongoing and regular, sue h as 
during both parties' routine work day, Petitioner will choose the d:iy care, 
subject to die Respondent's right of first refusal. 
B. If a parent is not available to care for the children when sporadic 
daycare is required, the parent who has the children in his/her care at the 
time will choose a daycare provider for the child. 
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r* *•*> 
children's day-to-day activities and care while the children are with that 
parent 
K. Doth parties can make emergency decisions regarding the children 
when the children are in his/her care and shall timely notify the other 
parent of said emergency. 
I.. Before making any non-routine decisions affecting the children 
(generally a decision which significantly affects the care or wellbeing of 
the child outside of that parent's time or requires significant effort by the 
other parent, it is considered a non-routine decision), which may include 
education, health care, extracurricular activities or religious activities 
regarding the minor children, Ihcy shall first consult each other by text or 
email regarding the decision, which means mat they shall each exchange 
at least one text or email about the issue before making a decision. After 
discussing the matter, Petitioner shall have final say in making all 
decisions regarding the children, except if the patties cannot agree on a 
therapist for treatment regarding the children's mental health, the therapist 
for the children shall be determined by a Special Master, Frederick A. 
Jackman. 
M. The parties shall support each other as parents in establishing and 
enforcing consistent rules and discipline in their respective households 
r t"*\ 
regarding bed lime, homework, lessons, school projects, ano $»«»*.•! .J 
conduct. 
N. The parties shall consult with each other if cither of them becomes 
aware that the children are experiencing difficulties in school, emotional 
problems, or any otficr issues that they each would wish to be infocm-cd of 
regarding their minor children. 
O. The parties shall hold the other in higli esteem in their 
conversations with the children, and enccurage the children's continuing 
love and affection for both parents. In no event shall either parly demean 
or disparage the other parent in the children's presence, orpr r ru t the 
children to remain in the presence of any third party who does so. 
P. Children's extracurricular activities: 
1. If the parties both agree to support the nctiv; ty, ibe ; o l ies 
shall work together to accommodate the child's participation hi the 
activity by coordinating transportation during his/her time and 
sharing the cost of the activity. The parties shall reasonably 
support music lessons and church activities. 
2. If the parties do not agree to support the activity., one parent 
can still have the child participate in the activity nt his/her cost 
during his/her parent time. 
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Q. Both parties shall be entitled to reasonable telephone contact with 
the children on days they do not see the children, which shall be 
unmonitored. 
R. Both parties shall keep each other informed of his or her address 
and telephone number at all times. 
S. ' . Bach party shall notify the other whenever he or she intends to take 
the children on ati overnight trip exceeding one night and provide the other 
•with a travel itinerary with addresses and telephone numbers when 
reasonably available where he or she may be Tcachcd in the event of an 
emergency. 
T. Both parents shall facilitate opportunities Tor the other parent to 
participate in enriching activities with the children. Respondent is hereby 
given the option (when he is willing and able) to perform all church 
ordinances, which must be done by a man, for the children. Petitioner 
shall be allowed to take the children on modier-daughtcr and mother-son 
activities when there is not an important conflicting event with 
Respondent. Likewise, Respondent shall also be allowed to lake the 
children to father-son and fauSer-daughter activities, and to take "William 
to general priesthood meeting twice each year when there is not an 
important conflicting event with Petitioner. Respondent shall be allowed 
^ 
to reasonably participate with William in scouting activities that William 
participates in. 
U. The parties shall reasonably work together to coordinate sharing, 
the children's homework, uniforms, clothes, and other objects that the 
children need in both homes, Clothes which go with a child to the other 
parent's hOUSC shall timely come back with the children. 
45. . Communication: The parties shall communicate in writing, by email or 
text messaging unless communication is time sensitive—then telephone 'communication 
can be used. The parties will treat each other respectfully and limit their discussions 10 
issues related to the children. 
46. Tax Exemptions: Jorm shall claim Jane and .Aniia shall claim William as 
tax exemptions. When Jane reaches majority, the parties shall claim William hi 
alternating years. Both parents shall cooperate in signing the appropriate IRS forms to 
effectuate this paragraph. 
47. Costs: Statutory provisions shall apply as it relates to daycare (Utah Code 
§ 78B-12-214), insurance premiums (Utah Code § 78B-J.2-212), and uncovered medical, 
dental, and mental health expenses (Utah Code § 78B-12-212), Said codes are attached 
hereto and incorporated by this reference. 
48. School'. If either party determines to move from Provo School District, he 
or she shall first provide 30 days notice to the other parent. 
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''W- ACAFS: The parties shall use ACAF S to create a calendar for their parent 
time, for which each party will pay one-half of the cost If there is a need to chance the 
calendar, they should communicate at least once via e-mail with each'other before 
requesting ACAFS to act as a mediator. No provision in this paragraph gives ACAFS 
decision-making authority. 
50. Communications Regarding Other Parent: The parties shall be mutually 
restrained from making derogatory remarks regarding the other party to, or in the • 
presence of, the minor children. The parties shall use their best efforts to prevent third 
praties from speaking in a disparaging manner about either parent in the presence of the 
cJJUJ. The parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks 
about the other party to his or her fellow employees, employers and/or ecclesiastical 
leaders. 
51. Child Support: Child Support in this matter shall be pursuant to statute 
and shall be baaed upon the parties' incomes and the parties* stipulation regarding 
custody and parent time. Respondent's income for the purpose of calculating child 
support shall be $2,382.00 per month. Petitioner's income for the purposes of calculating 
child, support shall be $5,333.00 per month. Respondent's child support obligation shall 
bs $126.00 beginning May 1, 2009. In one year, the Court, based upon future change of 
income, may review child support and make modifications even if mere is less than a 
15°. o change of income. 
<**> ^ 
52. Contempt: There shall be no citation of contempt against Respondent, 
except as it relates to an award of attorney fees. All requests for contempt sanctions other 
than as it relates to an award of attorney fees shall be dismissed. 
53. Kfarital Home: On or about October 27. 2008. the parties sold the marital 
home, which was acquired by the parties during their marriage, located at 874 East 1150 
North, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. The proceeds of this sale in the amount of 
approximately $42,312.26 were thereafter transferred to an account with Weils Fargo 
Dank, Account No. 339-3907724. These proceeds should be divided between the parties 
as follows: 
A. The proceeds shall be divided by the parties equally, such thiu each 
party will have $21,156.13. 
B. From Respondent's half of the proceeds shall be deducted the 
amount of $5,234.07 for child support related issues. This amount shall be 
added to Petitioner's share of Ac proceeds. 
C. From Petitioner's share of the ptoceeds shell be deducted the 
amount of $6,000.00 for her share of the marital debt. This amount shall 
be added to the Respondent's share of the proceeds, thereby, resolving ail 
issues of marital debt, except as otherwise set forth herein. 
D. Therefore, pursuant to the calculations set forth above. Petitioner 
shall have $20,390.20 of the proceeds, S5,234.07 of which has already 
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been disbursed to her, and Respondent shall have 521,922.06 of the 
proceeds: 
E. The amount of $5,234.07 has already been disbursed to Petitioner 
from the sale proceeds for child support related issues and this amount 
shall accordingly be deducted from her $20,390.20 share of the proceeds. 
F. The amount of $3,894.47 has also been disbursed to Petitioner 
from the sale proceeds to reimburse her for mortgage payments that she 
made on the marital home. 
54. Parlies' Homes; The parties shall not enter either of the other parties* 
homes without written invitation. In addition, the parties shall not go to the other's home 
without 24 hours written notice unless it is to pick up and drop off the children pursuant 
to written Dgreement or court order. 
•55. Personal Property. Each party is hereby awarded the personal property in 
his or her possession. 
56. Special Master. Frederick A. Jactonan is appointed as a Special Master in 
this matter and a Special Master Order shall issue. 
DATED this £f of FcbRtary 2010. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE : . • 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you are, hereby, notified 
that the foregoing Order will be sent to the court for signing upon the expiration of five 
(5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless a written 
objection is filed with the Court prior to that time. 
DATED titis ^ T d a y of September 2010. 
>rW!fkinson, Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, this 3 day of September 2010, a copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
John Wight 
1105 North 2780 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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